MIDTERM MOBILIZATION: 
THE PRESIDENT AS CAMPAIGNER-IN-CHIEF DURING 
MIDTERM HOUSE ELECTIONS, 1982-2006

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ABSTRACT

This article examines campaign rally appearances by sitting presidents during midterm House elections between 1982 and 2006. The conventional wisdom holds that such appearances by presidents are of little or no intrinsic value to the candidate, yet every president from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush has seen fit to hit the campaign trail on behalf of his co-partisans. The authors examine presidential appearances at rallies open to the public designed to attract partisan supporters. The authors find evidence to support the idea that these appearances are more than just a show of support and may have significant effects on both the level of voter turnout and the vote share received by a co-partisan.

INTRODUCTION

A modern president, as leader of his political party, is expected to work hard for the election of his co-partisans. The ease of modern jet travel has made it easier than ever for a president to hit the campaign trail for fellow party members. When a president’s co-partisan is successful in her electoral endeavor the popular press often attributes that success to an appearance by the president. [1] This attribution likely occurs due to the belief among many reporters and citizens that a midterm election serves as a referendum on the president’s job performance during the preceding two years. Some scholars concur with this idea based upon economic indicators such as the unemployment rate or change in personal income during a period preceding the midterm election. [2] Thus, a president presiding over a strong economy should be able to help his co-partisans win seats in Congress while a president with a less than stellar economy might be better off hunkering down in the White House. In spite of what the press believes, scholars actually know very little about the impact of presidential...
campaign appearances during midterm elections, leaving us with a rather cloudy picture of just what such appearances accomplish. The few studies that do address the question of presidential involvement in midterm elections either examine presidential appearances on behalf of U.S. Senate candidates or analyze appearances for House candidates during a single midterm election year. Even then, researchers have reached divergent conclusions, as we discuss below. [3] This research combines both approaches as we analyze presidential appearances for House candidates across a 24-year time frame. While the authors agree with Cohen et al. (1991) that presidential appearances may be enough to help a candidate secure victory in a close race, we also argue that these appearances have effects upon midterm elections that are not immediately discernible by the untrained observer. In particular, we are interested in whether presidential appearances increase the share of the two-party vote received by the president’s co-partisan and whether such an appearance reduces the marked decline in voter turnout that occurs in congressional races during midterm election years. Identification of these ‘hidden’ effects should help us to develop a more complete understanding of exactly what presidents accomplish through their intervention in congressional midterm elections. To accomplish this we need to know where presidents go and what they do during midterm congressional elections. We begin with an examination of the literature regarding presidential travel.

**Presidential Travel**

The scholarly literature regarding presidential travel generally falls into one of two broad areas, the purpose of presidential travel or the effects of presidential travel. While we are most interested in the effects of presidential travel during midterm elections, it is nonetheless helpful to review the relevant literature regarding where presidents go and what they do when they travel.

Scholars examining presidential travel during midterm elections argue that presidential travel is designed to further his own, or his party’s, future electoral or policy goals. A president may do this by choosing to travel to states where he is relatively popular in an attempt to consolidate his own political base. [4] This is certainly plausible during a first term midterm election, but holds no explanatory power during a second midterm election since the president is ineligible to seek reelection. Alternately, a president may choose to visit states with competitive congressional races to offer campaign and fundraising assistance to his fellow partisans. [5]

Thus, presidents may hit the campaign trail to build support for his own reelection bid, to help raise funds for his co-partisans’ electoral efforts, or to mobilize support for a co-partisan by making a stump speech on her behalf [6].

By doing these things the president is engaging in what some scholars have called ‘the permanent campaign.’ [7] In other words, a president is always campaigning for someone or something from the day he announces his bid for the Oval Office until he flies off to Andrews Air Force Base as a former president.

This permanent campaign exemplifies just how much the modern presidency has shifted away from the founding fathers’ vision of a chief executive that would transcend politics to one that is both sharply partisan and highly divisive today [8].
Table 1. Presidential Co-Partisan Win Percentage, 1982-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Visit</th>
<th>No Visit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favors President</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>.741</td>
<td>.699</td>
<td>.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favors Opponent</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>.167</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tossup</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.361</td>
<td>.383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>347</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.479</strong></td>
<td><strong>.435</strong></td>
<td><strong>.444</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures are proportion of races won by presidential co-partisan in each category. Source: Calculated by authors.

Table 2. Vote Share of Presidential Co-Partisans, 1982-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Visited</th>
<th>No Visit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favors President</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>.5206</td>
<td>.5173</td>
<td>.5180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favors opponent</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>.4795</td>
<td>.4693</td>
<td>.4720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tossup</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>.4992</td>
<td>.4869</td>
<td>.4888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>347</strong></td>
<td><strong>.5063</strong></td>
<td><strong>.4941</strong></td>
<td><strong>.4968</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures are proportion of the two-party vote received by presidential co-partisans. Source: Calculated by authors.

**The Effects of Presidential Midterm Travel**

The second theme prevalent in the presidential travel literature focuses upon the effects of presidential travel with most of the attention directed towards explaining the impact on electoral outcomes. Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman (1991) examined presidential appearances in midterm Senate elections between 1966 and 1986 and found that presidential appearances help to mobilize nonvoters and may push a co-partisan over the top in a very close election. The historic Republican gains in the 2002 midterm election stimulated a flurry of academic scholarship that examined the role of the president during the midterm elections. Herrnson and Morris (2007) argued that President Bush’s activity in 2002 helped his fellow Republicans pick up eight seats in the House and regain control of the Senate. Bush’s visits accomplished this by providing “…legitimacy to a candidate’s campaign” and helping candidates “…raise money, recruit more volunteers, and register, canvass, and mobilize more supporters.” [9] Keele, Fogarty, and Stimson (2004) disagree and posit that President Bush tended to visit places where Republicans were likely to do well anyway, thus sparing the president the embarrassment of campaigning for a lost cause. While this argument may seem logical on its face, for a host of reasons stated by Herrnson and Morris, we believe it to be an inadequate explanation of the results of the 2002 midterm congressional election. Given the disagreement between Herrnson and Morris and Keele et al. we set out to examine the impact of presidential appearances during midterm congressional elections for the U.S. House on
voter turnout and candidate vote share from 1982 through 2006. Recognizing that the ultimate goal of a president who makes an appearance for a fellow partisan is to help her win election to the House of Representatives, it behooves us to discuss the win/loss record of presidents when campaigning during midterm congressional elections.

The president cannot possibly go everywhere during a midterm election. Limited time and resources require each president to make strategic choices about where he will travel and whom he will try to help. Thus, presidents tend to focus their appearances for co-partisans embroiled in close races for the House. A campaign appearance by the president may attract thousands of presidential supporters and garner extensive media attention, transforming a low stimulus election into a high stimulus election that leads a greater number of citizens to vote on Election Day. Research indicates that elections with greater stimuli do draw more citizens to the polls than lower stimuli elections. While it is clear that many citizens are not as motivated to vote during midterm elections as they are during presidential elections, we do not yet know if an appearance by the president during a midterm election in a congressional district promotes increased turnout on Election Day. We argue that such appearances promote increased voter turnout in certain circumstances, which we discuss below.

Increasing voter turnout during a midterm election ought to be a goal of every president simply due to the phenomena of midterm seat losses by his party. From the earliest ‘surge and decline’ theory to current ‘electoral balancing’ theories, scholars have noted the fact that the drop in voter turnout during a midterm election is nearly always greater for the president’s party than for the opposition party. James Campbell (1987) has attributed the propensity of seat losses by the president’s party to a ‘surge’ in turnout among disadvantaged partisans, or voters whose party is out of power, and a ‘decline’ in turnout by advantaged partisans, or voters whose party holds the White House. We think this explanation is largely accurate and provides a president with yet another reason to hit the campaign trail in an effort to motivate advantaged partisans to get out and vote on Election Day. More votes by those who supported the president previously is likely to mean more of the president’s co-partisans in Congress, which should increase the ability of the president to implement his legislative agenda.

**TWO-PARTY VOTE SHARE AND PRESIDENTIAL VISITS**

A president may choose to employ his limited resources to campaign for a fellow partisan to enhance the likelihood that his administration will be able to pursue its political agenda and prevent the opposition party from setting the agenda. That is most likely to occur if his party controls at least one chamber of Congress, and preferably both chambers. If the president’s efforts are successful, more members of Congress will share the president’s party affiliation and, theoretically, policy preferences, particularly when party polarization is high. If the president’s party controls Congress, it should lead to smoother passage for the president’s legislative agenda. To move a nation in one direction or the other a president must have support for his agenda in Congress. Lacking this support, a president is apt to have considerable difficulty achieving his policy preferences.

A few other considerations are in order here regarding the study of presidential visits in midterm elections. Examining presidential appearances on behalf of a fellow partisan is
important to study as it may enhance our knowledge regarding the effect of these appearances on other variables such as media coverage, fundraising, candidate vote share, and voter turnout. For example, Barrett and Peake (2007) find that local media coverage of presidential visits tends to be more favorable and thorough than national media coverage, which is often much more adversarial in nature. [16] Likewise, Eshbaugh-Soha (2008) found that local media coverage of the presidency is more frequent and favorable in areas with greater support of the president. [17]

Jacobson, Kernell, and Lazarus (2004) argue that President Clinton’s campaign appearances on behalf of Democratic candidates for Congress in 2000 contributed significantly to the ability of those candidates to raise money by sending signals of candidate viability and presidential approval to prospective donors. [18] When a president visits a congressional district, he generates significant media coverage. Presumably, that coverage may contribute to an increase in the stimulus level of the election, which may benefit the president’s co-partisan.

Thus, we expect to find two measurable effects on the election related to presidential visit. The first is rather straightforward. Simply put, candidates for whom the president makes an appearance are expected to receive a greater share of the two-party vote than their fellow partisans for whom the president did not campaign, controlling for district level partisan preferences.

By strategically allocating presidential visits to friendly congressional districts presidents may also hope to engage sympathetic independents and weak partisans who normally vote only in presidential election years. If the president is able to motivate these voters to get out and vote while persuading them to vote for his co-partisan his efforts will have been successful. Stated as a hypothesis,

\[ H_1: \text{Candidates receiving a presidential visit are expected to receive a greater share of the two-party vote than candidates who do not receive a presidential visit.} \]

**Presidential Visits and Voter Turnout**

The mere presence of a competitive electoral race usually results in higher levels of voter interest and voter turnout. [19] We expect that when the President of the United States comes to town we should see a surge of voter interest in the race. This is likely a result of increased media coverage surrounding the president’s visit and the awareness of the upcoming election and the issues involved generated by media coverage of these visits. Visits may energize a candidate’s campaign staff, potentially leading to better mobilization efforts to encourage potential voters to go to the polls. Most visits occur during the final few weeks before an election when voter interest tends to peak. [20]

If presidential campaign appearances during midterm elections are able to stimulate voter interest, mobilize supporters, and energize campaign workers, there should be a discernible effect on voter turnout in these typically low stimulus elections. We expect that a presidential appearance will mitigate the decline in voter turnout typically witnessed in these districts when compared with the prior presidential election. [21] The primary effect of a presidential visit to a congressional district on voter turnout should be to rally his supporters and encourage them to vote for his co-partisan. If he is successfully able to mobilize and motivate
his supporters to turn out and vote on Election Day, an aggregate difference in the decline of voter turnout across visited and non-visited districts ought to be detected. Thus,

\[ H_2: \text{The difference in voter turnout between a presidential election and the ensuing midterm election is expected to be smaller in districts where the president campaigns than in districts where he does not campaign.} \]

Table 3. Net Difference in Voter Turnout from Prior Presidential Election, 1986-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Visit</th>
<th>No Visit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favors President</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>-.1554</td>
<td>-.1376</td>
<td>-.1413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favors Opponent</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-.1270</td>
<td>-.1293</td>
<td>-.1286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tossup</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>-.0779</td>
<td>-.1321</td>
<td>-.1256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>263</td>
<td>-.1247</td>
<td>-.1334</td>
<td>-.1315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated by authors.

THE MIDTERM DATA

Prior research has indicated that presidents are far more likely to make an appearance in a congressional district that features a competitive race for the House than in a congressional district that is considered safe (Mellen and Searles, 2013). Between 1982 and 2006, presidents made 81 campaign visits to congressional districts during midterm elections. For this paper, we utilized the *CQ Weekly* pre-election special forecast published closest to the date of the midterm election, typically mid-October, to identify competitive congressional races for the House. *CQ Weekly* uses a seven-point scale to rate congressional races, from safe for the Democrat to safe for the Republican. In between are races favoring one side or the other, races leaning to one side or the other, and pure tossups. Of the 81 presidential campaign visits between 1982 and 2006, 71 visits occurred in districts that fell into one of the three most competitive categories according to *CQ Weekly*. Only three of the other 10 visits occurred in districts that turned out to be far more competitive than *CQ Weekly* had forecast. Altogether, slightly less than 12% of all midterm House races were rated in the three most competitive categories during the period covered in this paper.

Tabulating the win and loss record of candidates for whom the president campaigned is simple and requires no explanation here. Data related to the share of the two-party vote received by each candidate was collected from the official data published by the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives. Calculating voter turnout by congressional district is relatively straightforward, but a bit imprecise due to the lack of specific data on the voting age population for each district. [22] Congressional districts more often than not reflect a cobbled together variety of disparate political interests based on geographical contiguity, as well as reflecting the preferences of the party responsible for drawing the boundaries, rather than a neatly packaged set of political entities from which one might gather political data. [23] In other words, congressional districts often cross many political and geographic

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\[ \text{[23] In other words, congressional districts often cross many political and geographic} \]
boundaries, making population estimates somewhat more difficult than, say, a single member district contained wholly within a single county or state. The U.S. Census Bureau periodically reports an estimate of congressional district populations designed to reflect changes in district sizes due to population change patterns. While the data are not as precise as we would prefer, errors in estimation are likely to be randomized across all congressional districts making the data useful for our current purpose. To calculate turnout rates for each district we relied upon the vote totals provided by the House Clerk and the population estimates for each district provided by the Census Bureau.

**MODEL SPECIFICATION**

In both hypotheses, we are interested in whether a presidential visit affects the difference in voter turnout between presidential and midterm elections, and the two-party vote share per district between 1982-2006. The problem is that districts for which a visit was observed likely differ systematically from districts for which a visit was not observed. In other words, we have selectivity issues. [24] As Keele and colleagues (2004) point out, “The problem of selection effects, in general, is that we cannot assume ceteris paribus that those states or districts visited were alike in all respects to those not visited.” [25] In effect, we have a selection issue: we argue that popularity of a president affects the decision to visit a given district and thus, needs to be accounted for when modeling the relationship between presidential visit and outcomes. For this reason, we estimate a Heckman (1979) selection regression model – the standard for models with selectivity issues and non-random assignment (Keele et al. 2004) – using the two-step estimator to test the effects of presidential visits on voter turnout and two-party vote share in districts where the president is popular. (26) Since our dependent variables are continuous, the first step generates a regression equation, while the second step utilizes a second “critical” binary variable to estimate a probit model to account for the truncated nature of the dependent variables. This approach allows us to estimate 1) the determinants of turnout/two-party share and 2) the likelihood of turnout/two-party share being observed in these popular districts. The binary variable used in the second stage, popularity, is measured as the difference between presidential vote share and opposition vote share in the previous presidential election, with 0’s assigned to districts with below average popularity (<.09), and 1’s assigned to districts with above average popularity (> .09; similar to Cohen 1991); the inclusion of this variable can be thought of as propensity for a district to be included in the sample. Thus, we are able to uncover the effects of a visit in districts where the president is popular, compared to districts where the president is not popular.

Diagnostic tests support the use of selection models, and point to the need for a log transformation of both dependent variables due to departures from normality. The first dependent variable of interest, difference in turnout, is the difference between district-level turnout for a presidential election and district-level turnout for the subsequent midterm election (for each of the key variables additional details on data collection above). [27] Given hypothesis 1, our expectation is that presidential visit will be positively related to difference in turnout. Given hypothesis 2, our expectation is that presidential visits will be negatively related to difference in turnout. The second dependent variable of interest, two-party vote share, is measured using the percentage of votes cast for the president’s co-partisan in the
district. The key independent variable, visit, is coded 1 if a president made a visit to a co-partisan’s district during a midterm election year from 1982-2006; no visit is coded 0. [28]

We include several additional control variables drawn from the literature and specific to our focus on district-level characteristics. [29] First, to identify the Heckman selection model, we include dummy variables for races classified as a tossup, for races leaning towards the President’s party and for races leaning towards the opponent – races classified as safe are omitted as the baseline. Also, we include dummy variables for three of the four presidents included in the sample – Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan – George W. Bush is omitted as the baseline. [30] Finally, in both the outcome and selection equations, we add variables designed to measure and control for the partisan character of each congressional district. Our primary measure here is the Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI) for each district. The PVI is simply a measure of the district’s presidential vote in the previous election subtracted from the national average of a party’s candidate for president in the previous two elections. Thus, if the GOP presidential candidate in 2008 received 63% of the vote in a congressional district and the GOP candidate for president averaged 48% of the presidential vote from 2004 to 2008, the district would receive a PVI of R +15 points, meaning the district is 15 points more Republican than the nation as a whole.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The model results are presented in Table 4. [31] First, both models indicate a selection process is at work. This bias is evident by the significant and negative inverse mills ratio, which indicates there is a negative residual correlation between unobservable factors influencing observable turnout and two-party share in popular districts, and unpopular districts. [32] Also, selection is demonstrated in differences in magnitude and direction of coefficients for both equations. [33] For instance, visit is positive and does not meet the threshold of significance in the outcome equation, but is significantly and negatively related to two-party vote share in the selection equation. Evidence of a selection effect suggests that there are systematic differences in turnout and two-party share in districts where the president is popular, versus districts where the president is unpopular. Moreover, this effect suggests that not only do presidential visits have an influence on both electoral outcomes, but, as predicted, these visits are endogenous to other unobserved factors. In other words, president’s visits affect electoral outcomes inasmuch as they visit districts where they are already liked.

Second, the results from the selection model demonstrate that several district-level variables affect turnout and two-party vote share. The first column presents the parameter estimates for the difference in turnout for districts in which the president is popular. Our primary independent variable of interest, visit, is significant and negative supporting hypothesis 2: a presidential visit reduces the difference in turnout between presidential and midterm elections, compared to districts in which the president is not popular. More specifically, districts that presidents visit share significant characteristics that affect both the likelihood of a visit and the outcomes of interest. Characteristics of the race (tossup, favors opponent), characteristics of the district (Cook Partisan Voting Index), and characteristics of the president (Clinton, Reagan, Bush) are all significant and negatively related to difference in turnout in districts where the president is popular, compared to districts where the president is not popular.
Table 4. Estimate of Effect of Presidential Appearance on Voter Turnout and Candidate Vote Share in U.S. House Midterm Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Difference in Turnout (SE)</th>
<th>Two-Party Vote Share (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome Equation (Regression)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit</td>
<td>-.261 (.142)*</td>
<td>.011 (.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Partisan Voting Index</td>
<td>.04 (.012)**</td>
<td>.005 (.001)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection Equation (Probit)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit</td>
<td>-.498 (.235)**</td>
<td>-.479 (.230)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Partisan Voting Index</td>
<td>-.276 (.03)**</td>
<td>-.282 (.029)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Clinton</td>
<td>-1.18 (.275)**</td>
<td>-1.27 (.271)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George H. W. Bush</td>
<td>-1.736 (.401)**</td>
<td>-1.79 (.395)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald Reagan</td>
<td>-2.848 (.368)**</td>
<td>-2.85 (.36)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District race is a Tossup</td>
<td>-1.409 (.695)**</td>
<td>-1.35 (.693)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District race favors President’s Party</td>
<td>-.913 (.681)</td>
<td>-.914 (.683)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District race favors Opponent</td>
<td>-1.26 (.692)*</td>
<td>-1.17 (.726)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverse Mills Ratio (Lambda)</td>
<td>-.436 (.158)**</td>
<td>-.044 (.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.79 (.723)**</td>
<td>-6.77 (.012)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p < .10; ** = p < .05, both dependent variables are log transformed.

This suggests that when selection bias is corrected and turnout is modeled for popular districts, the effects of presidential visits persist despite type of race, and the district’s makeup. Surprisingly, presidents select districts to visit using a calculus that does not necessarily include the chance of the party winning that district – perhaps winning is only a motivation for a presidential visit when the visit being warmly received by voters is a sure thing.
Of course, factors that affect a decision to visit are likely multiplicative— not singular— maybe it is presidential popularity in a district along with the state of a race. But even more surprisingly, this is not the case either: the insignificance of coefficients for races that favor the president suggest that turnout is not influenced by a visit to districts where the president is popular and the race leans towards the president’s party. Estimates for the two-party share in districts in which the president is popular, presented in column 2, demonstrate similar effects. However, these results do not support hypothesis 1, which argues a presidential visit will increase the president’s party vote share. Visit is significant, as are characteristics of the race (tossup, favors opponent), characteristics of the district (Cook Partisan Voting Index) and characteristics of the president (Clinton, Reagan, and Bush), but the relationships are not in the expected direction. Given hypothesis 1, we expected presidential visit to be positively related to two-party vote share. Instead, the results suggest that visits influence two-party vote share but not in the desired direction. Taken together, the results from each of these models support the idea that for districts in which the president is popular, presidential visits affect difference in turnout (H2), but the result of increased turnout may negatively affect the president’s party vote share (H1). What is left is an entirely unexpected and likely unintended consequence of presidential visits: a president’s visit may inspire increased turnout but among voters from the wrong side of the aisle. The president’s visit generates the sort of fervor a co-partisan may desire, but at the cost of also generating the same sort of fervor on the other side of the aisle. If anything, this model suggests that president’s may do well to better select the districts they visit—to privilege characteristics of the race over their own popularity—perhaps then, they may be able to increase their party’s electoral success. Overall, these results suggest that presidential visits have significant and negative effects on our two electoral outcomes of interest in districts where the president is popular.

**Conclusion**

In sum, presidential visits during midterm elections may be strategic, but they do not seem to be very effective in helping presidential co-partisans to victory. While a presidential visit may not be able to ensure a co-partisan’s victory or deliver a crushing defeat to an opponent, it may help to boost her share of the vote by a few tenths of a percent in some tightly contested races. A president with a high approval rating is likely to be more effective in this regard than one who is rapidly losing popular support. As Cohen et al. (1991) showed for Senate contests, these few tenths of a point may make the difference between winning and losing in a tight race.

From a practical standpoint, what does this mean for future presidents during midterm elections? First, a president should focus his campaign appearances on the most hotly contested races, particularly in competitive districts that favored him in the prior presidential election. The political landscape in most elections will likely favor the president’s opposition. It is almost a certainty that the presidential party will suffer losses in the midterm elections as the electorate rebalances the partisan playing field. Given the evidence uncovered in this paper, there is little hope that a presidential barnstorming tour of the country will be able to reverse those losses. However, if the president focuses on those tossup races in districts most favorable to him, he may be able to salvage a few seats for his party. However, a presidential visit is unlikely to make the difference in most of the competitive congressional
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races during the midterm election. Nevertheless, a president should do all he can to encourage citizen participation in a system that rests upon popular sovereignty because, after all, winning isn’t everything.

REFERENCES

[10] We exclude the 2010 midterm election during President Obama’s first term due to the fact the president made only two campaign appearances during the general election. Instead, the president chose to have several ‘backyard’ chats in a couple of congressional districts that were carried by cable news channels.


[15] Note, however, that this is not a guarantee. President Clinton’s Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress from 1993-95 and he was unable to secure a floor vote on his proposed healthcare reform package.


[21] The best measure of this would be comparing voter turnout in the election in which the president appeared with the historic level of turnout in midterm elections for the congressional district. However, such data is not maintained and is virtually impossible to tabulate due to factors such as competitiveness, redistricting, and changing population figures for districts that are not uniformly available.

[22] The authors are aware of the controversy regarding the underestimation of voter turnout using the voting age population (VAP) versus the voting eligible population (VEP) as argued by McDonald and Popkin, 2001. Due to the lack of precise data on the VEP by congressional district, we chose to utilize the broader measure of voter turnout in this paper.


[24] In other words, we must correct for selection effects that arise when observed cases differ systematically from unobserved cases.


[26] We use Stata SE 10 to estimate our model. For the first equation regression techniques are utilized, the second equation utilizes probit.

[27] District level voter turnout is calculated by dividing the total number of votes cast by the Census Bureau population estimate of the voting age population in each congressional district at the beginning of each Congress.

[28] While it would be preferable to allow for multiple presidential visits on behalf of a co-partisan, there were no such cases.

[30] When estimating a selection model it is necessary to include some variables in the selection equation not included in the first stage. Often researchers will include a random exogenous variable to help identify the model, however, it is preferable to include variables for identification purposes that match theoretical expectations as we do here. The assumption was that each of the three presidents and classification of competitiveness might affect the likelihood of us observing the outcome while not directly determining the outcome.

[31] The model specification proves robust regardless of respecification.

[32] The Inverse Mills Ratio is what is known as a selection hazard, and quite simply its inclusion in the second stage model takes into account selection bias.

[33] Recall that the dependent variables have been transformed; therefore a one unit change in the independent variable represents a 100% change in the dependent variable.